The Advocacy of Facebook Public Group *"Info Cegatan Jogja"* to Prevent Gangsterism Action *"Klitih"* in Yogyakarta, Indonesia

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Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 55183, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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ABSTRACT

"Info Cegatan Jogja" is a popular public group on Facebook in informing social issues around Yogyakarta city, Indonesia. The information of netizens who get the most comments and responses is the gangsterism action known as "Klitih" in Yogyakarta. The term Klitih has been a street violence phenomenon that deeply disturbs the life of social, economic, education, and tourism in Yogyakarta. This study describes the role of the Facebook group "Info Cegatan Jogja" in advocating for the prevention of Klitih gangsterism in Yogyakarta. The analytical technique used was the mixed-method approach in the form of discourse analysis to capture the news dynamics and netizen responses to the phenomenon. The results of this study found that Facebook public group "Info Cegatan Jogja" can mobilize civilian awareness to participate and communicate intensively to encourage law enforcement officials to take firm action against their actions. The Facebook group "Info Cegatan Jogja" has become an important channel for community solidarity education in facing street violence "Klitih" in Yogyakarta.

1. Introduction

The gangsterism action has been a trending issue that is troubling the community. Sociologically, gangsterism existence due to the gaps that occur in the structure of society, especially in urban areas, which then triggers protests as an expression of individual and group dissatisfaction. Most of the gangsters conduct their actions come from those who are unable to experience economic prosperity like others, such as those who do not have education so they do not have jobs or even do not have skills that they can use properly (Solichin et al., 2017).

Gangsterism is a form of social deviation where the gangster action disturbs security and order (Bushman et al., 2016) and even disturbs the community. In their action, they performed sadistic actions such as criminal acts and violence using thuggery acting, extorting, robbing, and intimidating (Hamdan, 2017).

The *Klitih* is a new case of street violence. The word *Klitih* means looking for something, that does not always connotate violence. The word *Klitih* has various meanings. Based on the Javanese dictionary (2002), *Klitih* (*Klitih*an or *Nglitih*) is a word of Javanese Jogja dialect that is usually used as a repetition word, *klitah-Klitih* that means going back and forth. The meaning of the word klitah-*Klitih* is often used only partially to become *Klitih* or *Nglitih* whose meaning tends to be negative. The word *Klitih* or *Nglitih* is then synonymous with acts of violence and crime committed by adolescents or teenagers (Bramasta, 2020). However, recently *Klitih* has been synonymous with street violence by a group of young people seeking random prey to violence. The term *Klitih* is used as an expression of violence rather than its original meaning.

Commonly, *Klitih* is conducted individually and group by those who come from low neighborhoods. The actions usually are at night in lonely streets and they attack the victim using sharp weapons, then they will extort the valuable objects (Wibowo & Ma'ruf, 2019).

Klitih is gangsterism that needs to be controlled by law enforcement such as the police and the prosecutor's officers. The community involvement, in this case, is more about reporting activities and law enforcement officials then take action. The *Klitih* case as an expression of gangsterism is rare due to the perpetrators are minors. The violence happened were spontaneously and sporadically. Even though it was committed by minors, the violence was beyond the normal limits of the child's crime. Several people have become victims, from seriously injured to death (Fuadi et al., 2019).

The sadistic act of *Klitih* caused tremendous horror for the people in Yogyakarta, especially at night. *Klitih* has created the impression that Yogyakarta is a dangerous city, both for its residents and the number of tourists visiting Yogyakarta. This condition is very influential for a good image as *Kota Berhati Nyaman* (a city with a comfortable heart) (Republika.co.id, 2016).

The victims consisted of students, office workers, and even online motorcycle taxi drivers. The number of casualties caused unrest among the community, that then the people use the public group on Facebook "*Info Cegatan Jogja* (ICJ)". Through this group, people can share information related to the occurred incident, such as information about lost items, interceptions, even acts of gangsterism, including *Klitih* in Yogyakarta to remind each other and increasing awareness.

The ICJ community uses Facebook to express their voices and concerns regarding the increasing action of *Klitih* in Yogyakarta. ICJ is an informal community with 1,027,218 community members. Many ICJ members indicated that this public group has become an important medium for the citizens of Yogyakarta to communicate on many social problems facing them. ICJ has become a new association that exercises many social controls, both control of public behavior and criticism of government policies that are perceived as less responsive to the interests of society. The brilliant idea of ICJ is how to build Yogyakarta as a city of students,

culture, and tolerance so that people can live in harmony so that Yogyakarta remains a special city.

This study intends to trace how the Facebook public group community intensively discusses the *Klitih* phenomenon as a social disease that has destroyed the image of Yogyakarta. How is social awareness formed on Facebook, and how is articulation in the form of news from community members being responded to by law enforcement officials related to the *Klitih* actions.

2. Literature Review

Street violence studies in urban areas have been conducted and classified into four major studies. Firstly, a study using a criminal approach. This approach assumes that street violence is a criminal offense with a weighting related to the use of weapons in it. The *Klitih* is sometimes committed by young people, often underage. Busyro conducted research related to acts of street violence in Batangtoru. The Violence committed by street gangsters cannot be tolerated and must be controlled (Busyro, 2019).

In research from Hamdan (2017) shows that the gangsters` violence is better charged by the criminal justice system than other justice systems. The reasons for deciding the criminal justice system due to their actions have deeply disturbed the life of society. In line with Hamdan, in research from Nugroho et al, (2017) also state that criminal offenses are very strong. So that to manage criminal activities, the criminology approach will be very effective.

Secondly, a study using a psychological approach. This approach assumes that deviant behavior in the form of street violence is part of personality disorder. Street violence acts as part of the compensation mechanism for the one who experiences social problems at home or in the most private environment (Veale & Donà, 2003).

In research from Pitaloka (2020) states that the control related to the existence of street gangsters need to be conducted persuasively through a counseling approach. Gangsters' actions as deviant behavior activities can be managed with private communication skills so that thugs can find new awareness and eventually leave the action. Pitaloka's view is also supported by the research of Huda & Lubis (2020), that awareness education for *Klitih* perpetrators is more substantial by assisting to bring up self-adolescent while serving time in prison. Without this approach, *Klitih's* acts of violence will continue to be street gangsters again even though he has been given a harsh sentence.

In research from Wibowo & Ma'ruf (2019) found that the criminalism approach is not always appropriate in the case of "*Klitih*", so it needs a substantial justice-based approach. Actions against the law do not just appear suddenly but take a long process. The law is not only for judging and punishing but also for rehabilitation.

Thirdly, a study using a socio-economic approach. Violence with the motive of confiscating goods is caused by economic pressure and pressure so that street violence as part of compensation gets economic access. Vigil's study shows that the problem of road violence is closely related to low economic status. Vigil found that groups of people who migrate to cities who have to struggle to gain economic access amid inadequate skills and knowledge make the probability of migrant groups becoming gangsters is greater (Vigil, 2003).

Street violence is inseparable from political violence. *Preman* (gangsters) can be a political tool to intimidate groups as political opponents, as well as to mobilize people to join certain political groups. In research from Veale & Dona (2003) has shown this phenomenon occurred in Rwanda.

This phenomenon then recommends controlling street violence due to the migration factor in the form of restrictions on population movement. immigrants or non-native people are considered potentially to the act of crime. This stereotype has even occurred in democratic countries such as the United States, which have made policies to restrict immigrants (Brabeck et al., 2011).

In research from Kristiansen (2003) study of street violence behavior in Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara that shows a strong logic that street violence behavior is more driven by economic motives. So the control of street violence through the development of sub-urban community welfare, so that there is no migration to the city.

Fourth, studies using communication. The phenomenon of street violence is the result of a multilevel communication distortion. Both in the context of interpersonal communication and public communication. Interpersonal communication is related to the unavailability of private space owned by violent actors, making the Gank group the most likely personal space to receive personal complaints (Bennett & Brookman, 2009). Public communication is related to the unavailability of public space which allows violent actors to express themselves so that their complaints can be heard, and their expressions can then be channeled (Stretesky & Pogrebin, 2007).

The fourth approach seems to provide a large space for the advocacy process on the issue of street violence. This article will mostly use the fourth approach, that management of violence can be managed by establishing communication through social media (Paulo et al., 2013). Nowadays, the perpetrators of street violence are commonly using social media (Draucker & Martsolf, 2010). Communication in social media that can reach many groups will help build awareness of street crime perpetrators that their activities are monitored by the wider community (Paluck, 2009).

Social media can reach communication on many sides, both to law enforcement officials, academics, journalists, ordinary people, and the form of communication is very open and intensive (Cavallo et al., 2014). Media is a means of sharing social reality information (Kurtz, 2014), building collective awareness, and controlling social behavior. One of the social media capable of carrying out this role is Facebook (Johnston et al., 2013).

This article will explore how social media "Facebook" becomes a piece of social reality information, discuss it intensively, urge, bully, criticize, evaluate policies (Morissan, 2014). How the news on social media then accompanies a joint action in the line of social media becoming a social action, and finally produces policies as discussed in social media (Marlina, 2018). This study has more novelty than *Klitih's* previous study in the form of tracking the use of social media such as Facebook as a tool to build mutual awareness (ICT Watch, 2018) to build a culture of harmony in society.

3. Research Methodology

To get an advocacy structure from the Facebook group *"Info Cegatan Jogja"* in sharing *Klitih's* actions, this study used a mixed-method with the content analysis and the discourse analysis approaches. Content analysis was used to identify the information structure on the social group *"Info Cegatan Jogja"* in the three months from October to December 2019 where *Klitih's* actions increased into the highest rate.

The results of this tracing were processed and analyzed with content analysis in three stages. First, tracing the actors who described *Klitih's* actions, whether they came from civil society, or the bureaucracy (security). Second, tracking the percentage of *Klitih's* coverage compared to other social issues. Third, tracking netizens' responses to *Klitih's* news, whether

enthusiastic responses are in expressions of anger, frustrated, and immediate follow-up, social criticism, or just plainly expressed, in viral form or with diction, and or even bullying those who posted *Klitih* information such as abusing, over, or to get attention.

To deepen the narrative of social awareness actions formed in the coverage of the social media group *"Info Cegatan Jogja"*, was referred to expert opinions regarding the relevance of proportional social action to face *Klitih* as reported by online mass media related to Police actions in controlling *Klitih* issues. To manage and analyze data from online mass media coverage of the National Police's response to *Klitih* using discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is focused on how online media reports about *Klitih's* actions, how the government and security forces respond to the *Klitih* actions, and how netizens respond to policy choices from the government and security forces.

4. Results and Discussion

Tracing its history, *Klitih's* action in Yogyakarta is not new. The culture of violence perpetrated by students in Yogyakarta has been going on for a long time with the existence of two large legendary groups, namely the *QZRUH* group or an abbreviation of *Q-ta Zuka Ribut* for entertainment. The followers of the *QZRUH* group are called "cahQezer". This group builds sentiment among students in the northern region of Yogyakarta.

While the second group is known as the *JOXZIN* group which stands for *Joxo Zinthing* or *Pojox Benxin*. *JOXZIN* named his followers "*JXZ or cah 14*". This group builds sentiment among students in the southern region of Yogyakarta. During the New Order era, these two gangs were affiliated with or used by political parties as a mass base, representing the nationalist spectrum from the *QZRUH* group and Islam from the *JOXZIN* group. The two groups used to show their existence on the streets by holding convoys at political events (Salam, 2016).

The *Klitih* phenomenon in Yogyakarta has various motives based on two types of *Klitih* actors, namely individual and group actors. First, individual *Klitih* is usually not specific to *Klitih* perpetrators. According to the Head of the Special Prison for Children (*Lembaga Pembinaan Khusus Anak* or LPKA) in Yogyakarta, one of the *Klitih* perpetrators who were assisted in LPKA admitted that they did not know the motive for his actions and admitted to only having fun together with his friends (Pangaribowo, 2020).

Research conducted by Soeprapto from 2008 to 2010, the perpetrator always drank alcohol and drugs before carrying out the *Klitih* action. *Klitih's* action is also due to the lack of provision of social values and norms provided by the family so that children experience disorientation or choose the wrong friends and environment in social interactions (Kompas.com, 2020). The trigger for *Klitih's* action also came from feelings of disappointment, family problems, heartbreak, problems in the school environment, association, or rebellion against the system. This is then exacerbated by the condition of adolescents before puberty, who have a strong spirit but are still psychologically unstable (KumparanNEWS, 2017).

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the violence in Yogyakarta has changed from time to time. This is evidenced by the difference in the actions carried out between the two legendary groups in Yogyakarta, *QZRUH*, and *JOXZIN*, with violent acts known as *Klitih* which have been rife recently.

Currently, many *Klitih* cases occur where the perpetrator is under the influence of alcohol and injuring the victim with a sharp weapon. Besides, in the action, the perpetrator does not have the motivation and also clearly targets the *Klitih* victims, which in the end is detrimental to many parties. In short, the current *Klitih* tends to have high guts without a clear direction.

Klitih's action now is different from the actions carried out by gangs in Yogyakarta so far. Clits carried out by gang groups usually target their competitors' gangs. Although there are frequent brawls between gangs, the number of victims of the wrong target or blind targets is almost rare. Even in several brawls between gangs, casualties to death are minimal. The group also sets clear motivations and targets. Besides, members of the legendary gang in Yogyakarta have good knowledge of martial arts, so that when fighting they know which body to attack without causing the victim to suffer fatal injuries or cause casualties (Anshori, 2020b).

The *Klitih* phenomenon in Yogyakarta has various motives based on the type of *Klitih* perpetrator. First, individual *Klitih* actors usually do not have a specific motive. According to the Head of the Special Prison for Children (*Lembaga Pembinaan Khusus Anak* or LPKA) in Yogyakarta, one of the *Klitih* perpetrators who were assisted in LPKA admitted that they did not know the motive for his actions and admitted to only having fun together with his friends (Pangaribowo, 2020).

Second, the *Klitih* perpetrators in groups. The motive is very unique, that the violent action is used as a medium to prove whether the *Klitih* Phenomenon action can occur when a group recruits new members. Usually, it is through this *Klitih* action that is used as a recruitment pattern for juniors in their group. After successfully carrying out the *Klitih* action, juniors are considered to be part of them. This is in line with Soeprapto, a sociologist for criminality at Universitas Gadjah Mada, who revealed that *Klitih's* motive for action was used as part of the search for group identity and existence. *Klitih's* action is also used as a measure of the courage of a person in the group by committing acts of violence and also as a form of loyalty from members to the group (Puspita, 2020).

Referring to the data presented by the Regional Police of Yogyakarta, throughout 2016 there were 43 cases, in 2017 there were 51 cases, in 2018 there were 45 cases, while in 2019 there were 44 *Klitih* cases, and until January 2020 there were 5 *Klitih* cases recorded. in Yogyakarta. *Klitih* actors usually consist of more than one person using sharp weapons such as swords, machetes, sickles, gear motors, and various other sharp weapons.

Figure 1. Sharp Weapons of *Klitih* Gangsters
Source: Damarjati (2020)

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Of all *Klitih* actions occurred, approximately 70% of the perpetrators were students (Syambudi, 2020). The action of *Klitih* was mostly conducted at night around 9 pm, above 11 pm even before dawn. The *Klitih* perpetrator acted by hitting, stabbing, and hacking the victims using sharp weapons. Most *Klitih* perpetrators attack people that they do not know, the victims can be school students, university students, the public, and even online motorcycle taxi drivers, using sharp weapons as a form of threat. It is not uncommon for the victims to suffer sharp weapon wounds to their body parts, there are even several *Klitih* incidents that have resulted in the death (KumparanNEWS, 2017).

4.1. Information Structure of *Klitih* on ICJ

The rise of the *Klitih* action, which caused many casualties, received a variety of responses among the people of Yogyakarta, starting from the wider Yogyakarta community, the parents of *Klitih* victims and the parents of the *Klitih* perpetrators. The majority of people feel uneasy about the *Klitih* action which is increasingly rampant and not a few people have criticized the action. The general public response can be seen through social media, including through the Facebook group "*Info Cegatan Jogja* (ICJ)".

The ICJ Group was originally formed as a medium to share public service problems, but as situation changes and the crime rate in Yogyakarta increased, the public began to share the latest information related to criminal acts in the group. The formation of the ICJ group was based on a high sense of solidarity. Through this group, the community embraces each other, providing information related to public services to the ongoing crime.

One of the crimes frequently discussed at the ICJ is the *Klitih* action. Many of the people shared information related to *Klitih* in the ICJ group, starting from information related to the victim, the crime scene, and the chronology of *Klitih's* occurrence. By sharing information, it is hoped that the community will increase their mutual awareness and also increase their sense of solidarity to help each other. Apart from sharing information about *Klitih's* actions, the ICJ group was also used as a community to share their worries regarding the *Klitih* action in Yogyakarta. Many people also demand firm action from the police against the *Klitih* perpetrators.

Based on tracing news data about *Klitih* on ICJ social media, from October to December 2019, through content analysis techniques the following data were obtained. The first is data on actors who post *Klitih* news. Second, data about the content of the news in *Klitih's* news posts. Third, data on the number of responses from netizens to the content of *Klitih's* news. Fourth, data about the content of netizen responses to news content about *Klitih*.

Table 1. The Elements Reported *Klitih* on ICJ

Category	Amount of Reports	%
Public	9	75
Law Enforcement Officials	3	25
Total	12	100

Source: Research Data (2019)

Table 1 revealed that the majority of parties who informed about the *Klitih* action came from the community, the amount of 9 people with a percentage of 75%, and the other 25% from law enforcement officials. This condition means that civil society has an awareness of sharing important information that can encourage fellow community members to seriously respond to

the *Klitih* phenomenon. Most of the news from netizens is reporting on incidents, both those experienced by netizens themselves, as well as reporting information they have seen and documented for later "viral" through ICJ media.

Netizens who reported *Klitih's* information complete with many evidence such as photos of the incident, victims or perpetrators who have been arrested, as are the principles of journalists in compiling news, such as elements of Who (who is the actor), Whom (who is the victim), When (when did it happen), Where (where it happened), How (how did it happen). This documentation is important, where the admin of the ICJ requires the reporting process in ICJ to go through a strict filter process by the admin. Not all netizen news can be "passed" because the news is invalid and will instead be seen as a hoax.

The structure of social media coverage is fast and it does not pass a long bureaucratic. the news story as a medium for netizens to report the *Klitih* incident more quickly than reporting to security agencies such as the police officer. This is related to the view of netizens that many ICJ members come from law enforcement officials so that information can be directly responded to without going through a formal bureaucratic process. The existence of *Klitih's* news from law enforcement circles as a response to some information on *Klitih's* news that was less detailed. So that law enforcers who are members of ICG need to remind netizens so that *Klitih's* news is not reported dramatically which can provoke feelings of insecurity.

Posts from law enforcement officials show that officials are trying to be proactive in responding to the aspirations of the community. Reporting from law enforcement officials tends to provide follow-up information from the public regarding the *Klitih* phenomenon or to socialize actions against *Klitih* by continuing to prioritize a legal approach and not to take the action of taking justice into your own hands.

Table 2. Report Contents about *Klitih*

Post Contents	Amounts	%
News	6	50
Complaining	2	17
Offering Helps	2	17
Following Up	2	17
Total	12	100

Source: Research Data (2019)

Table 2 shows 4 types of *Klitih's* news on ICJ social media. The first type of post is a post related to news about the occurrence of *Klitih* with 6 posts with a percentage of 50%. The news includes the chronology of the occurrence of *Klitih*, when the *Klitih* occurred, to the victims resulting from the action of *Klitih*. The second post is a public complaint regarding the rampant *Klitih* that has occurred in Yogyakarta. In ICJ social media there are 2 posts of complaints from the public and get a percentage of 17%. Most of the community complained about the security of the city of Yogyakarta, especially at night, and regretted that *Klitih's* actions were mostly teenagers. The third post is in the form of 1 offer of assistance coming from the community and 1 assistance from law enforcement officials with the percentage of both of them being 17%. Assistance offered from the community is in the form of escort, while assistance from legal officials is provided in the form of a 24-hour standby call in the event of a *Klitih* action on the road. The fourth news is the follow-up requested by the community, such as the confirmation of

punishment for the *Klitih* perpetrators, as well as the follow-up provided by law enforcement officials in the form of raids on teenagers at night in places prone to *Klitih*.

From **Table 2**, there are unique variations in reporting. This means that ICJ is not just social media to release social fatigue and entertainment media, but a space to build social criticism. It is critical to always remind netizens to be careful when traveling at night. Criticism towards *Klitih* actors who do not reflect the personalities of the people of Yogyakarta who prioritize polite and respectful principles, respect for others, and refrain from committing actions that have the potential to hurt other parties. Also, netizens perceive criticism of law enforcement officers as having not effectively prosecuted the perpetrators.

The criticism of the news is built simultaneously and reciprocally. Simultaneously in the sense that *Klitih's* news is carried out continuously and in line. When there was information on *Klitih* that was informed by netizens, other netizens also reported similar information in other areas in the Yogyakarta area. This simultaneous feeding has two side effects. First, simultaneous reporting was then perceived that Yogyakarta was already in the *Klitih* emergency level, because *Klitih* occurred in some places, repeatedly and with a high degree of horror. Second, the simultaneous *Klitih* reporting made the reactions of netizens heroic, patriotic, and even expressions of hatred, a very deep curse against the perpetrators.

The heroic and patriotic actions were conveyed in the form of proactive actions by netizens to carry out civilian patrols to ensure that the roads in Yogyakarta were truly safe. Netizens set up patrol posts independently and reported the activity to the ICJ. The news of this patriotic action received a tremendous response so that some posts began to be established in areas where *Klitih* had been reported.

Actions of blasphemy and condemnation are conveyed in provocative sentences so that the *Klitih* perpetrators stop activities that are disturbing the community. If the *Klitih* perpetrators are not deterred, they will face community punishment, which can be heavier than formal punishment, such as in prison. Expressions of cursing and blasphemy usually get a very varied response, from solidarity to increasingly blasphemy and some reminders not to commit acts that violate the law related to violence against *Klitih* perpetrators.

A reciprocal response is in the form of reporting from law enforcement officials to respond to reports on information, complaints, and assistance from civil society, such as information that the police have been conducting regular and measured patrols to anticipate the *Klitih* incident. Including news that some *Klitih* perpetrators have been arrested and have gone through the legal process under the criminal acts that have been committed. This news is exposed in the form of photos and news links about press conferences held by the police and local governments.

Law enforcement officials also socialize so that repressive actions against *Klitih* perpetrators become the domain of the state so that civilians do not take repressive actions that violate the law. Netizens are asked to carry out social surveillance through character education in schools, in the community, and to monitor the activities of young people not to leave the house at night without a clear purpose.

Table 3. The Number of Netizen Responses on *Klitih* Reports

Post Contents	Amounts	%
News	9,952	46
Complaining	1,314	6
Offering Helps	2,107	10

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Post Contents	Amounts	%
Following Up	8,201	38
Total	21,574	100

Source: Research Data (2019)

News related to *Klitih* has received a lot of response from the public; this is evidenced by the many comments given by netizens in posting netizens on ICJ. Of the four categories of posts, the news category received the greatest response compared to other categories. This means that the ICJ has been perceived by netizens as a reliable and updated source of information about *Klitih* news. Netizens choose to report *Klitih's* information via social media rather than sending letters of complaint to law enforcement or the mass media.

The awareness to share important information about *Klitih* makes netizens so responsive every time there is a *Klitih* news post. This means that netizens have put *Klitih* news at the center of attention, and have become trending topics. The magnitude of the response can also mean that the security "issue" of Yogyakarta is in a bad position, thus making an "unsafe" situation for netizens. The many expressions of response also mean that law enforcers can move faster so that they can return Yogyakarta as a city with a comfortable heart.

The magnitude of the response to the post-follow-up news also reflects that netizens consider it necessary for law enforcement officials to follow up on information submitted by netizens at the ICJ. Netizens raise issues so that law enforcement officials can prioritize security issues by managing *Klitih's* problems proactively and professionally.

The news of *Klitih's* post that was filled with complaints turned out to get the least response. This shows that ICJ social media netizens are highly conscious netizens, based on real accounts and not robot accounts. In the context of social media, many responses are intentionally made through robot accounts to lead to an opinion from the robot account owner. The number of responses will make the voice of netizens to be led into the dominant news structure.

Posting a complaint about the existence of *Klitih* but not accompanied by convincing documentation did not pass the filter from the ICJ admin. Even if the ICJ admin passes it, the response they get is not sympathy, it can even create antipathy. The disproportionate dramatization of complaints makes the response of netizens counter-productive. The responses that were received were not sympathy and attention, but instead, they questioned the truth of the news and even came up with a bullying tone.

Table 4. Public Responses on *Klitih*

Public Responses	Amounts	%
Supports/Sympathy	8,607	55
Neutral (up)	647	4
Irrespective/ Bullying	6,490	41
Total	15,744	100

Source: Research Data (2019)

Table 4 shows a unique reality. After analyzing the contents of the response content from netizens, it is illustrated that the posts that provide support and sympathy are dominant. However, netizens who gave unsympathetic or discordant responses also took the second-

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highest number. The number of sympathetic and unsympathetic responses that only disagreed was only 14%, indicating that there are divisions in the views of netizens regarding news posts about *Klitih*.

Does this mean that in the ICJ social media, there are *Klitih* perpetrators who defend themselves against their actions? Questions like this often appear in comments from several netizens. As a very open social media, this opportunity cannot be denied. But usually, the oblique comments against *Klitih* victims are immediately drowned in the response of other netizens who continue to voice their sympathy and support for several victims. As a moderate form, many netizens who want to post about the *Klitih* incident are worried about getting bullied attacks, from the beginning they have posted the sentence, "no bullying, okay?"

From this description, it can be interpreted that the role of ICJ in building advocacy narratives for victims of *Klitih* still gets greater support. Although the difference is only 14%, it does not mean that the bullying group is the pro-*Klitih* group. There is a possibility that groups that bully are groups that build criticism in discussing *Klitih's* actions so that security in Yogyakarta is not perceived as bad by people outside Yogyakarta. Which in the end will affect the economic, social, and cultural wheels of Yogyakarta because many people outside Yogyakarta are afraid to come to Yogyakarta.

The sympathetic response is reflected in the expression of giving prayers for the victims who suffer an illness, or even death. Responses appeared in news posts related to the sincerity of netizens who built security posts to escort netizens who need help. Positive responses can also be found from posts related to the performance of law enforcement officers who have managed to manage *Klitih* issues well. Where in January 2020, the trend of posting news about *Klitih* has greatly decreased compared to September to December 2019.

How about a less sympathetic response. Many of these responses were found from *Klitih's* posts which were not supported by convincing documents and evidence. Netizens then gave judgment to the account that reported *Klitih's* news, which was deemed irresponsible.

However, there are also posts about *Klitih* that blame the netizens who are victims of *Klitih*. Netizens who report themselves to be victims of *Klitih* are more of their own mistakes. For example, a woman who is desperate to travel at night that is late, or in the early morning without being accompanied by someone who can protect. The phrase crime occurs because there is an opportunity, as has become the tagline "*Bang Napi*" that "crime does not only come from the intent of the criminal, but also from an opportunity to do" is often used to bully netizens who post *Klitih*. After all, they are considered to be feeding themselves as bait.

Or netizens who report themselves to be victims of *Klitih*, but the wounds shown in the pictures are perceived as not evidence of *Klitih* victims. In several post pictures of victims claiming to be *Klitih* victims, however, small wounds were found that did not reflect long and sharp cuts. Where it is illustrated that *Klitih* victims usually get stab wounds from swords, as well as stab wounds to the head, or blunt object blows that are often used by *Klitih* perpetrators (see **Figure 1**). If the wound of the *Klitih* victim is perceived by netizens to be an inconclusive wound, netizens tend to bully the account that posted *Klitih*.

4.2. Facebook Public Group Advocacy becoming a Social Advocacy

The news about the massive *Klitih* on the lines of social media and mass media has created social collective action in the community to urge law enforcement officials to respond quickly. Some social groups were formed to respond to the rampant *Klitih* actions that were continuously being voiced through ICJ social media and mass media in Yogyakarta.

Online Inter-Driver Coordination (*Koordinasi Antar Driver Online* or KADO) is a social organization formed by online motorcycle taxi workers to deal with the *Klitih* threat in Yogyakarta. In the case of *Klitih* in Yogyakarta, online motorcycle taxi drivers are vulnerable to *Klitih's* actions because they have to deliver customers at the time, place, and time specified by the customer. KADO stated that Yogyakarta was an emergency in *Klitih*, so KADO carried out an advocacy action to provide online motorcycle taxi drivers with a sense of security by patrolling each night to monitor the condition of the drivers who were working using the WhatsApp (WA) group. KADO also advocates for online motorcycle taxi drivers by conducting hearings with law enforcement officials to guarantee security protection for online motorcycle taxi drivers (Anshori, 2020a).

The rise of the *Klitih* action which has caused unrest in the Yogyakarta community has received the attention of the Community Organization and Volunteer Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Ormas dan Relawan* or FKOR). FKOR is a forum for various mass organizations and volunteers in Yogyakarta to mutually positive social activities in the context of creating a safe, comfortable, and prosperous situation and condition for the people of Yogyakarta. Even though they come from various backgrounds, mass organizations, and volunteers who are members of FKOR have the same goal, namely to create security stability in Yogyakarta.

Volunteers who are members of FKOR consist of *Merkid's*, *Paksi Katon*, *Gebrak*, *Merkade*, *Lakodya*, *Atmo 5*, *GM-FKPPI*, *Banser*, *Relawan Sena Putra*, *MKJ*, *Predator Enterprise*, *Brigade Bintang 9*, and *Front Masyarakat Madani*. This forum is not affiliated with any political party and religion while respecting the right to political freedom and the right to freedom of religion among its members (FKOR DIY, 2019). In action to create a safe, comfortable, and prosperous Yogyakarta, FKOR conducts advocacy activities in the form of joint declarations with elements of society as well as audiences with law enforcement officials.

FKOR advocacy opens a complaint post for victims of *Klitih*. The establishment of this post is one of the efforts to create security stability in Yogyakarta. The first complaint post for *Klitih* victims was established in Banguntapan, Bantul and soon another complaint post will be established in each district in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta* or DIY). The *Klitih* complaint post focuses more on handling *Klitih* victims using assistance in reporting the *Klitih* incident to the authorities. This was done by FKOR because many *Klitih* victims were afraid to report the *Klitih* incident to the authorities because they had received threats from the *Klitih* perpetrators.

The collective action of the massive and systematic *Klitih* reports gave birth to a serious response from the civil bureaucracy and security. The Governor of Yogyakarta Special Region, the Yogyakarta Police Chief, and the Regional People's Representative Assembly of Yogyakarta have seriously responded to the rampant *Klitih* actions in Yogyakarta. Policies to overcome *Klitih* are made systematically by involving several related stakeholders. Regarding the dominance of security issues, the police have also responded to the *Klitih* phenomenon and have also reported it through social media lines and press conferences.

Security law enforcement officers have also sent some personnel to enter as members of the ICJ to correspond directly with several netizens. The police have also created a hotline that is ready on-call whenever netizens need tactical assistance regarding the *Klitih* action.

The size of the news response about the follow-up reflects that netizens can communicate well with law enforcement officials. Responses of praise and respectful greetings were given to netizens regarding the news that some *Klitih* perpetrators had been arrested. Regular patrol

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coverage, both in areas where the *Klitih* case has occurred, has also received appreciation from netizens.

News related to assistance to avoid opportunities for *Klitih* action on the streets also received a very large response. This means that social media has been able to build concrete mass solidarity by providing direct assistance services. This advocacy is very important because there has been a security advocacy movement at the grassroots which is also managed independently. The response of praise for high willingness and solidarity immediately appeared in large numbers after netizens posted pictures of some netizens preparing to patrol or guarding some corners of Yogyakarta.

The desire of netizens to make a Regional Regulation on *Klitih* loudly voiced on social media has not yet been realized. However, that does not mean that local governments are ignorant of this phenomenon. The *Klitih* phenomenon in the perception of local governments and Regional People's Representative Assembly does not yet need a special regulation at the level of a local regulation (*Peraturan Daerah* or Perda), because there is a concern that existing regulations overlap. The regional government of Yogyakarta province has made a tactical policy so that the *Klitih* phenomenon can be neutralized productively.

5. Conclusion

The phenomenon of *Klitih* as one of the gangsterism expressions in marginalized social groups in urban areas has become an emergency social disease. The attribute as an area that has high manners and tolerance is still likely to be exposed to acts of social gangsterism.

The management and prevention of *Klitih* violence show a new trend in which the community is building solidarity through social media. Social media has become a strategic instrument to build awareness to prevent street violence. Open social media can encourage law enforcement officials to carry out their main duties and functions professionally and productively.

The article is still based on the initial study so that further exploration is needed on the contribution of social media in the management of social problems in urban areas. Tracing using an ethnographic approach is expected to further deepen the findings that have been found in this article.

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