

Towards the Achievement of Papua's Independence in the Framework of Statehood


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ABSTRACT

Since Indonesia gained independence in 1945, security dynamics have been intricately linked with conflict. The emergence of separatist movements, such as the Free Papua Movement or Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM), has significantly disrupted Indonesia's stability. This study aims to analyze the actions undertaken by OPM in their quest for independence, utilizing the perspective of the Montevideo Convention of 1933. Employing a qualitative descriptive research methodology, this research relies on secondary data from a literature review focused on the Papua region. The study reveals several key findings: The size and stability of a population are critical factors for the existence of a state. West Papua, with a population of 1.15 million, plays a pivotal role. The establishment of well-defined territories is crucial for distinguishing and representing nations. The proposed establishment of the Republic of West Papua has garnered support and recognition from nations like Vanuatu. Moreover, the Republic of West Papua actively engages in international organizations such as UNPO. Establishing and exercising effective government control over a nation's territory is essential for asserting sovereignty and maintaining independence. This is exemplified by the Papua National Manifesto and the declaration of Papua's independence in 1961. Building and maintaining relationships with other countries necessitate active participation in the global community. International recognition and support play pivotal roles in achieving long-term political goals. Challenges related to democracy, human rights, and environmental issues pose significant hurdles to Indonesia's diplomatic relations. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle offers a framework for preventing mass atrocities and holding state actors accountable

for crimes against humanity. International cooperation and dialogue are imperative in addressing these complex issues and safeguarding the well-being of affected populations.

Keywords: 1933 Montevideo Convention; Free Papua Organization (OPM); Papua; Responsibility to Protect (R2P); Statehood

1. Introduction

Social, political, and security dynamics have been prevalent in Indonesia since its independence in 1945 and are inseparable from conflicts arising from perceived disparities or injustices among regions. The emergence of separatist movements, such as the Free Papua Movement or Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM), significantly disrupts the sovereignty and stability of Indonesia (Malo, 2017). Following Indonesia's proclamation, the Dutch government separated Papua from the Dutch East Indies and prepared it to form an independent government from the Netherlands. To assist Indonesia in maintaining its territorial integrity, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in Papua was established by the UN (Sugandi, 2008).

The term "OPM" was coined by the Indonesian government to refer to separatist groups attempting to break Papua away from the country. These groups are led by prominent figures both domestically and internationally. In 1963, OPM gained notoriety under the leadership of Permenas Ferry Awom for their armed rebellion in Manokwari and other regions of Papua (Andrianto, 2001). In subsequent developments, July 1 is commemorated by supporters of Free Papua as the birthdate of OPM. This is because, on that date in 1971, a declaration of independence for Papua was made, with Seth Jafeth Roemkorem serving as the interim President of West Papua. It should be noted that the concept of West Papua at that time was not understood as the current "West Papua Province" but rather included the entire western region of Papua New Guinea (Detiknews.com, 2020).

OPM has undertaken numerous efforts and actions in their pursuit to free Papua, including incidents of shooting and other violent acts resulting in numerous casualties and building destruction. Table 1 categorizes the conflict into three eras: Pre-Integration of Papua and Indonesia, Post-Integration of Papua and Indonesia (under the leadership of President Soeharto), and Post-Fall of the New Order - Reform Era. These actions were carried out as resistance against the Indonesian government. However, the violent actions of OPM have backfired, damaging their reputation among the Papuan community.

Table 1. The Flow of Conflict and Rebellion

No.	Pre-Integration of Papua and Indonesia	Post-Integration of Papua and Indonesia (President Suharto's leadership)	After the Collapse of the New Order - The Reformation Era
1	Permanes Awom and Johan Ariks led the attack on Shell Oil Company.	Bernadus Wally led the attack in the Ubrub District of Jayapura in 1969.	The university students of Cendrawasih organized a demonstration.
2	The assault took place	The popular uprising in	The establishment of the

No.	Pre-Integration of Papua and Indonesia	Post-Integration of Papua and Indonesia (President Suharto's leadership)	After the Collapse of the New Order - The Reformation Era
	during the Swearing of Allegiance Flag Ceremony on July 26th, 1965.	Enarotali during the period of February to August 1969.	National Liberation Council.
3	On July 28, 1965, Ferry Awom led attacks in Oransbari and Afrai, Manokwari.	The assault on the GKI post in Pagai on April 7, 1977.	The raising of the OPM flag in Biak Island in July of 1998.
4	On July 28, 1965, a hostile attack was carried out on the dormitory of Yonif 641 Cenderawasih.	On the 16th of May 1978, ABRI posts were attacked and led by Marten Tabu.	On October 24, 2011, Dominggus Oktavianus Awes, the Chief of Police in Mulia, was fatally shot.
5	The interception of ABRI troops by OPM in 1967.	The hostage situation involves government officials, the military (ABRI), and the Lorentz WWF and UNESCO Expedition Team.	The attack on a public bus occurred on January 8th, 2012.
6	The assault on Pos Makbon that occurred on January 21st, 1968.		The incident involving the shooting of a Sumatera Barat transmigrant (January 21st, 2012) has been reported.
7	The assault on Pos Irai Anggi occurred on March 4th, 1968.		On January 31, 2012, there was a report of drug smuggling by the OPM.
8			The hostile incident involving Trigana Air's civilian aircraft on April 8th, 2012.
9			On 1 July 2012, a routine security patrol was attacked by OPM forces.
10			On 9 July 2012, there was an attack against two civilians and one member of the TNI in Paniai.
11			The tragic incident of 31 bridge construction workers being killed on December 1st, 2018, on Trans Papua Road.

No.	Pre-Integration of Papua and Indonesia	Post-Integration of Papua and Indonesia (President Suharto's leadership)	After the Collapse of the New Order - The Reformation Era
12			Throughout 2018, there were 26 instances of shootings resulting in the fatalities of 29 individuals, comprising 22 civilians and seven members of the military and police forces.
13			Demonstrations and unrest occurred in Malang, Surabaya, and Papua on August 19, 2019.
14			Based on Papua Regional Police records in 2019, several districts in Papua experienced 23 shooting cases.
15			According to the data released by the Papua Regional Police in 2020, 49 incidents of terrorism were reported across seven districts. These incidents resulted in the loss of 17 lives, comprising 12 civilians, four military personnel, and one police officer.

The OPM body is generally structured into three wings: political, covert, and an armed wing commonly referred to as the Papuan KKB, notorious for creating disturbances. The three wings of OPM compete with each other to secure their interests (Surya.co.id, 2021). On Tuesday, December 1, 2020, Benny Wenda declared himself interim president of the State of West Papua through a tweet. Despite such a declaration, the armed separatist group in Papua, known as the West Papua National Liberation Army-Free Papua Organization (Indonesian: Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat-Organisasi Papua Merdeka or TPNPB-OPM), does not recognize Benny's claim. The faction vehemently rejected his assertion, calling him an agent of foreign capitalists. It is worth noting that Benny resides in the UK, not in Papua.

The ideological aspect of the OPM has also seen a split. The older generation of OPM tends to embrace a Western ideology, with notable figures such as Markus Kaisiepo, Nicolaas Jouwe, and Herman Womsiwor. On the other hand, the younger generation of OPM espouses neo-Marxist/Socialist ideology, including Ben Tanggahama, Saul Hindom, and Jacob Prai ([Djopari, 1993](#)). According to IPAC, an organization staffed by distinguished researchers such as Sidney

Jones, Azumardi Azra, and Todung Mulya Lubis, the OPM movement is highly decentralized and has numerous competing factions. Despite projecting a guerrilla-type image in the media, the centralized command structure within the OPM is impracticable due to a combination of clan and ethnic loyalties, personal connections, remote terrain, and individual agendas. Consequently, communication between units and commanders is limited, and there is a regular turnover of units and commanders.

The political factions of OPM were established to unite divergent movements ([Detiknews.com](https://www.detiknews.com), 2020). The groups in question are enumerated as follows: (1) In 2004, the West Papua Nasional Authority (WPNA) was established to provide overall political oversight to all OPM organizations. The founders of this authority were Edison Waromi, Jacob Rumbiak, and Herman Wanggai; (2) The West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCCL) was established in 2005 by Otto Ondowame, a member of OPM Pemka, in Vanuatu Papua New Guinea. The highest-ranked commander of the organization is Mathias Wenda. The WPNCCL aims to serve as a political wing of OPM, but not all armed members of OPM agree with this proposition. Goliath Tabuni and Kelly Kwalik are among those who do not support the idea; (3) The Free West Papua Campaign was established in 2000 by Benny Wenda from Wamena, who had been arrested by authorities in 2002 for allegedly instigating an attack on a police station in the Abepura area. After escaping to Papua New Guinea, Benny obtained political asylum in the UK; (4) KNPB (Indonesian: Komite Nasional Papua Barat), or the West Papua National Committee, was established as a radical political organization in 2008. Its leadership was assumed by Victor Yeimo in 2012. In May of the same year, KNPB attempted to ally with the armed group OPM by convening a meeting in Biak and appointing Goliath Tabuni as its top commander. However, Goliath subsequently showed no interest in the proposal; and (5) The United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) was established on December 6, 2014, by WPNA, WPNCCL, and KNPB. Benny Wenda serves as its spokesperson. ULMWP is currently an observer in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG); however, Indonesia is also a member of MSG.

The West Papua National Liberation Army (Indonesian: Tentara Nasional Papua Barat or TNPB) serves as the military faction of the Papua Merdeka Separatist Organization. It was established on March 26, 1973, following the proclamation of West Papua Independence on July 1, 1971, at the Victoria Headquarters. The formation of TNPB is following the West Papua Republic Interim Law under the Defense and Security Section, Part V, which was passed in 1971. As a result of reforms within TPN in 2012, Goliath Tabuni was appointed as the Chief Commander of TPNPB ([BBC News](https://www.bbc.com/news/indonesia-2009), 2009).

The military strength of TPNPB-OPM is composed of 29 strategically placed Regional Defense Commands (Indonesian: Komando Daerah Pertahanan or Kodap) throughout Papua. Each Kodap is comprised of 2,500 personnel, consisting of 2,500 permanent members and several hundred thousand reserve personnel, prepared for immediate deployment ([BBC News Indonesia](https://www.bbc.com/news/indonesia-2018), 2018). However, General Tito Karnavian, the Chief of the National Police, reported that only 30 to 50 individuals were involved in the incident, with a total of 20 firearms. These weapons were acquired through various means, including seizing them from negligent members of the armed forces, purchasing them from the Ambon conflict in Maluku, and illegally smuggling them across the Papua New Guinea border. The TPNPB, commonly known as the Armed Criminal Group (Indonesian: Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata or KKB) in Indonesia ([The Diplomat](https://www.the-diplomat.com), 2021), employs guerrilla tactics to target and destroy industrial structures that contradict Indonesia's development initiatives. During these attacks, as well as others, they

wield weapons in limited numbers, including machetes, bows and arrows, axes, revolvers, and rifles.

2. Literature Review

2.1. The Concept of Statehood

The concept of the state, as employed by many political scientists, draws influence from Max Weber's well-known definition. According to Weber, the state is a group that possesses compulsory jurisdiction, maintains continuous organization, and lays claim to a monopoly of force over a given territory and its inhabitants, encompassing all activities underway within its jurisdiction. Weber emphasized that his definition pertains principally to means rather than ends, with force being the primary means. By employing this definition of the state, the focus shifts to empirical instead of juridical attributes, thereby emphasizing *de facto* rather than *de jure* qualities associated with statehood. This approach has proven especially attractive to political scientists and is an important aspect of Weber's sociological perspective on the state (Parsons, 1964).

Weber acknowledges the importance of legal aspects in defining statehood. Still, to the disappointment of many students of international law, he fails to delve into the true nature of territorial jurisdiction. This is deemed an international legal condition rather than a mere sociological factor (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).

As defined by Weber, a state's fundamental measure of existence is its ability to claim a monopoly on using force within its territorial jurisdiction. The acquisition of this ability by an external or internal entity that can effectively challenge a national government and establish a zone of monopolistic control confers the essential attribute of statehood. According to Weber's *de facto* criteria, the existence of two concurrent monopolies of force over a single population and territory is impossible. In instances where a contested territory cannot be controlled permanently by one of several competing groups or claimant states, Weber posits that it is more suitable to refer to the situation as one of "statelessness."

2.2. The Concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The emergence of the concept of R2P was a result of the recurring inefficiency of the international community in addressing genocides and mass atrocities during the 1990s. Numerous fields, such as peacekeeping, refugee and displacement work, international diplomacy, and humanitarian relief, realized the pressing need to protect individuals from grave harm in various locations. This led to increased attention and efforts toward safeguarding human life from abhorrent maltreatment (Bellamy & Dunne, 2016).

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, identified three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These pillars are equally important and not necessarily sequential. The first pillar is the primary responsibility of states to safeguard their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as from incitement to these atrocities. The second pillar is the states' duty to assist each other in building the necessary capabilities to fulfill the first responsibility. The third pillar is the international community's responsibility to take swift and effective action to protect populations from the crimes mentioned above when a state fails to do so (Welsh, 2009).

3. Research Methodology

The research method adopted for this study is qualitative research with a literary research approach. This type of research uses literary sources to gather data. Hence, in this study,

literary references serve as the primary source. The literature review and data sources were obtained by examining and analyzing various academic publications, including books, journals, and documents related to the development of OPM.

A literature review involves utilizing various literature and documents as primary data for analysis (Zed, 2008). Therefore, the literature acquired serves not only as a means of designing the research but also as a primary data source for analysis. Implementing the literature review methodology has been proven to be highly beneficial in examining significant findings and providing potential directions for a problem or discussion through a concise and systematic analysis of knowledge (Quan-Hoang et al., 2020). The data analysis method employed is descriptive analysis, which aims to gather as much supporting research data as possible (Arikunto, 2010).

4. Results and Discussion

The different factions of OPM are constantly seeking global attention. Hence, strategies and maneuvers are being implemented to achieve their goal of separation from the Republic of Indonesia.

According to a press release by the Head of Information of Joint Defense Region III, Colonel Czi IGN Suriastawa, it has been acknowledged that despite the existence of various internal factions and competing interests within the group known as OPM, three primary wings constitute the organization: the political, clandestine, and armed wings. These wings employ social media channels to communicate, plan actions, and propagate false information to shape negative opinions about the Indonesian government (including the Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) concerning Papua-related issues across multiple social media platforms (Koreri.com, 2021).

Using social media as a campaign tool is widely regarded as a highly advantageous option among organizations. Social media is widely recognized as an effective and easily accessible tool that can be utilized anytime and anywhere. Moreover, it offers fast dissemination of information to the public (Ulfa & Fatchiya, 2018). ULMWP has effectively promoted its campaign through its social media network, such as its Twitter account @FreeWestPapua and its Facebook account, Free West Papua (Samad & Permatasari, 2021).

Previous investigations have been conducted on the social media network of the Free West Papua Campaign by exploring text consumption methods using data from reader responses such as retweets, retweet quotes, comments, and likes obtained through Twitter accounts @FreeWestPapua and @BennyWenda, as well as the Free West Papua Campaign Facebook page (Rumila & Effendi, 2020). Another study explored the Facebook accounts of the Free West Papua Campaign. Martadikusumah investigated the use of West Papua independence propaganda through the Free West Papua Campaign Facebook account (Martadikusumah, 2019).

Other studies have indicated that in an asymmetric conflict between the Free West Papua Campaign (FWPC) and Indonesia, FWPC has employed music and song to resist Indonesia. This approach aims to exert pressure on the Indonesian government through the international community by disseminating the message via social media without directly targeting Indonesia (Jahamou & Wiswayana, 2020).

4.1. Countries that support the OPM

Several Pacific countries, including Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu, have openly expressed their support for separatist activities in Papua. These countries have consistently

disturbed Indonesia in various UN forums, accusing the Indonesian government of human rights violations in West Papua and openly lending their support to the separatist group Free Papua Movement. Additionally, some other countries or groups provide covert support to the Papua separatist movement for political and economic motives, apart from the three countries above ([Pepnews.com](https://www.papuanews.com), 2018).

Vanuatu is a small nation located in the Melanesian region of the South Pacific. Since 2014, the country has been actively highlighting human rights violations committed by the Indonesian government against indigenous peoples in Papua. Diplomatically, Vanuatu has expressed its support for Papuan independence and liberation from Indonesian colonization. Throughout various international meetings since 2016, Vanuatu has consistently called attention to past human rights violations by the Indonesian government in Papua, urging the United Nations to investigate such violations and demonstrating support for Papuan independence. Vanuatu's active involvement in addressing human rights abuses in Papua is driven by shared Melanesian ethnicity, past colonialism, and ongoing violations of human rights ([Temaluru, 2016](#)).

In response to the overt accusations made against Indonesia by certain Pacific nations in the UN forum, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consistently and firmly defended and refuted them at every opportunity. Moreover, the Ministry has conducted outreach to countries or groups believed to have the potential to support the Papua separatist movement.

4.2. The Internationalization of Papua

Recent developments in the international campaign and diplomatic efforts of the separatist movement in Papua have expanded to include parliamentary diplomacy. This progressive initiative is exemplified by the advocacy work of Benny Wenda, a prominent figure who was arrested by Indonesian authorities and later fled to the UK. As an activist of the West Papua Council, Wenda has collaborated with the Westminster House of Commons to establish the International Parliamentarians for West Papua, thereby forming a West Papua caucus in the British Parliament outside of the United States. Additionally, Wenda has launched an OPM representative office in Oxford, UK, as part of his ongoing efforts ([Nainggolan, 2014](#)).

The internationalization of the West Papua issue has become a pressing concern for Indonesia in the South Pacific region, particularly since President Jokowi took office. The growing concerns arise not only from the statements made by South Pacific nations in international forums but also from the circulation of news and photos related to human rights violations in West Papua. Social media has become the primary means for pro-independence activists and new actors to voice the West Papua issue. As a result, public and government officials in South Pacific nations such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Vanuatu have been influenced by the spread of information on social media. Pacific Islanders have shown support through protests, murals, and statements from government officials to the West Papua community ([Lantang & Tambunan, 2020](#)).

The separatist movement in Papua is capitalizing on the current social and political momentum to advocate for their interests and aspirations ([Nainggolan, 2014](#)). They are actively seeking political support from the global community to achieve Papua's independence. The movement established representative offices in various countries, initiated social media campaigns, negotiated, and influenced international forums.

Table 2. Efforts to Internationalize OPM with State Actors

Country of Destination	Time	Canal	Instrument	Attempts Made
Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, and Guyana	May 3, 2016	State (Group)	Meeting	The International Parliament Meeting for West Papua convened to discuss political issues and formulate strategic plans regarding the upcoming independence referendum of West Papua, scheduled for 2020.
				The Westminster Declaration was formally established during the meeting to endorse the self-determination of the people of West Papua.
United Kingdom	September 7, 2017	Political parties / Parliament	Meeting	The dissemination of the referendum results to Jeremy Corbin, the Labour Party Chairman and the British Opposition Chief.
	February 27, 2020			Inviting British Members of Parliament to attend an OPM parliamentary meeting in Britain.
New Zealand	May 10, 2017	State	Meeting	The Declaration of Westminster for West Papua was launched at the Parliament of Aotearoa, New Zealand.
Pacific Island Forum (PIF)	August 28, 2018	State (Group)		The OPM has called the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) to raise the issue of West Papua to the United Nations General Assembly.
	September 9, 2017			Requesting support from PIF to endorse the self-determination of OPM.
Vanuatu	January 28, 2019	UN	Petition / Referendum	The submission of a petition for the West Papua independence referendum to the United Nations High

Country of Destination	Time	Canal	Instrument	Attempts Made
				Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet.
International world	2016 - 2020	Mass media	Website	The formulation of a framework regarding the reporting on the human rights violations in West Papua, as well as the activities carried out by OPM and the institutions involved in their support. - Bennywenda.org - Freewestpapua.org
Kenya	December 9-10, 2019	State (Group)	Meeting	The OPM has joined the Vanuatu delegation at the 9th African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) High-Level Conference to request support for West Papua's right to self-determination.
Dutch	March 10, 2019	State	Protest action	Organizing a #ClimateMarch protest action with the agenda of highlighting the issue of Free Papua through covert means.
Solomon Islands	March 19, 2020	State	Meeting	A meeting was arranged with Hon. Matthew Cooper Wale, the leader of the opposition party, Solomon Islands Democratic Party, to foster trust amongst the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members in hopes of securing permanent membership.

Source: (Putri, 2022)

Bayuseno & Windiani have categorized the negative issues surrounding Papua that have been brought to the international stage into four main categories. These are (1) Economic issues related to the annexation and utilization of Papua's economic potential and assets by non-Papuan individuals; (2) Political issues related to the origin of assimilation and Papua's political identity; (3) Security issues related to various events of severe human rights violations and

political violence; and (4) Cultural issues related to cultural and racial segregation between Indonesianization and Papuanization (Bayuseno & Windiani, 2020).

4.3. 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States

States have been deemed preeminent legal subjects throughout history, surpassing other international legal actors. Consequently, states are conferred with rights and obligations delineated by international law following their status as legal subjects within the international legal system (Sugiyanto, 2017).

According to J.G. Starke, a nation is an institution that represents a system governing the relationships between and among individuals, serving as a tool to achieve critical objectives, including providing a structured system to encompass human activities. Brierly shares a similar view, stating that the state as an institution functions as a container where people can achieve their objectives and engage in their activities (Maskun et al., 2008).

The continuous internationalization efforts of Papua by the OPM are closely tied to the fulfillment of Papua as a nation-state. As stipulated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, four essential elements must be achieved to attain statehood (Grant, 1999).

According to Article 1 of the Convention, a state recognized under international law must satisfy four criteria: 1) a permanent population, 2) a defined territory, 3) a government, and 4) the ability to enter into relations with other countries.

1) A permanent population

The presence of a stable population is a prerequisite for the existence of a State, although the specific population size required to sustain it remains uncertain. There are some countries across the globe, such as China and India, which contain more than a billion inhabitants. Conversely, some states, such as Nauru and Tuvalu, also have populations of less than ten thousand individuals living within their territories.

The Republic of Papua Barat claims the province of Papua Barat, and as of the end of 2021, the total permanent population of the region reached 1.15 million individuals. Of this figure, 57.5% have not yet entered matrimonial unions, while 39.93% are already married. In addition, 0.61% of the population has undergone a legal separation, while 1.95% have been divorced (Katadata.co.id, 2021).

2) A defined territory

The presence of defined territories is a significant aspect of every country, as it serves as a fundamental element that distinguishes them and allows for their physical representation on maps and charts. Hence, a country must possess the land to establish and maintain its credibility and recognition as a legitimate entity.

The proposed establishment of the Republic of West Papua by the separatist group, the Free Papua Movement, comprises the territory of West Papua. The province consists of seven regencies, 86 districts, 21 villages, and 803 hamlets, with a total land area of 64,134.66 square kilometers, as indicated on the official website of the West Papua Provincial Government (2023) (Hadi & Bernada, 2015). This proposal has received support from the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, as demonstrated by the Wantok Blong Yumi Bill passed by the Vanuatu Parliament in 2010, officially declaring Vanuatu's foreign policy in favor of West Papua's independence. The Parliament has also called for West Papua to be granted observer status in the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the Pacific Islands Forum. Since its founding in 1991, the Republic of West Papua has been an active member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), according to the World Encyclopaedia (2023) (Sukmalalana et al., 2020).

3) A government

Each nation must establish a functional government that exercises physical and administrative control over its territory. Failure to demonstrate competence in managing and regulating land under its sovereignty will hinder a nation from asserting its sovereignty vis-à-vis other nations. Therefore, every nation must exercise control over its territory as proof of its sovereignty.

In October 1961, the National Committee of Papua, consisting of 70 Papua figures, formulated the Papua National Manifesto in response to the prevailing circumstances. The manifesto outlined various aspects (Al Rahab, 2010), including establishing the name of the country as Papua, determining the national anthem as Hai Tanahku Papua, selecting the national flag as Bintang Kejora, establishing the foundation of the state as Kasih, choosing the emblem of the state as Burung Cenderawasih, and 149 articles of Burung Cenderawasih State. Subsequently, with the approval of the Dutch Government, the declaration of Papua's independence took place on December 1, 1961 (Sari & Palupi, 2023).

4) The ability to enter into relations with other countries

Establishing and maintaining relationships with other countries necessitates high involvement with the global community. A nation's capacity to engage in diplomacy, communication, and diplomatic missions with other countries is crucial. This requires the international community to recognize a state's legitimacy as a sovereign entity.

The ongoing efforts by the OPM to internationalize Papua are aimed at securing recognition for the Republic of West Papua as an independent state. This proposition was one of the recommendations arising from the Second Papuan People's Congress, which called for the creation of a team to lobby the international community, including appealing to the United Nations Security Council to fulfill its mandate of maintaining peace and security globally, including safeguarding the security and well-being of the people of Papua until a stable government is established. Additionally, the Congress urged the Presidium of the Papuan Council to engage in dialogue with Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United States, and the UN (Elyzabeth, 2006).

International support is crucial in achieving the long-term political goals of separatist groups in Papua who seek to secede from Indonesia. The Indonesian government has labelled this movement as Papua separatism, which is considered a challenge to Indonesia's sovereignty. However, the decision to maintain sovereignty over Papua is final for the Indonesian government. In response to the actions and attitudes of separatist groups, the Indonesian government engages in lobbying and diplomacy to secure and maintain international commitments to support the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, of which Papua is indivisible.

The international support for the pro-independence movement in Papua presents a significant complexity in Indonesia's diplomatic relations with foreign governments. Although Indonesia's political legitimacy in Papua is robust, its bargaining power weakens concerning global concerns regarding democracy, human rights, and environmental issues in the region. Such issues are often used as a benchmark to assess the success or failure of developing nations' governments. For the pro-independence groups, particularly the OPM, these global issues become a critical strategic element that significantly influences their position and ultimately becomes their "struggle" in international forums.

One of the crucial criteria in achieving international recognition, as acknowledged by international law, is the last criterion among the four. Hence, the issue of human rights violations committed by the Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police is

fervently raised by OPM to pave the way for international troops to enter Papua, as the entry point is governed by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept. R2P is intrinsically linked with the United Nations (UN), and its origin can be traced back to the declaration made by the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Its framework emphasizes enforcing UN principles to enable the international community to fulfill its responsibility to protect. The establishment of R2P as the foundation for a new global consensus must be pursued within the UN forum (Thakur & Weiss, 2009).

The globally accepted principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) aims to prevent the recurrence of heinous crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The inadequacy of the international community's response to the mass atrocities that occurred in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in the 1990s emphasized the need for this concept. The International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty formulated the R2P concept in 2001 (Egerton, 2012).

The R2P framework is built around three fundamental principles of responsibility: Pillar 1 requires each state to take responsibility for protecting its citizens from the four major crimes of mass atrocity, including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Pillar 2 mandates the wider international community to support and encourage each state in fulfilling their responsibility. Finally, Pillar 3 stipulates that if a state genuinely fails to protect its citizens, the international community should be prepared to take collective action that is appropriate, timely, firm, and following the UN Charter.

In essence, the principle of Responsibility to Protect strengthens the concept of sovereignty by enabling governments to fulfill their current obligations. This presents a new prospect for the United Nations system to assist countries in preventing outlined violations and protecting affected populations by enhancing their capacity, issuing timely warnings, and implementing preventive and protective measures rather than solely relying on reactive measures.

Crimes against humanity constitute a particular form of an offense committed in the context of large-scale attacks that intentionally target civilians regardless of their citizenship. These crimes entail the most heinous violations of human dignity, particularly when directed toward civilian populations (Edele, 2021).

According to Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Schabas, 2017), state actors may be held criminally accountable for committing crimes against humanity, specifically in the context of systematic or widespread attacks against civilian populations. The following acts are considered crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, deportation, forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced sterilization, persecution, enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid and "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to the body or mental or physical health."

5. Conclusion

The continued efforts of the OPM to internationalize Papua cannot be separated from the aspiration for Papua to become a recognized state. As stipulated by the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States, four important elements must be met to achieve statehood. According to Article 1 of the Convention, a state recognized under international law must satisfy the following criteria: 1) a permanent population, 2) a defined territory, 3) a government, and 4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Out of the four criteria for a state to be recognized under international law, the last criterion is crucial for the OPM to pursue in its efforts to obtain international recognition. Therefore, the

issue of human rights violations by the Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police continues to be emphasized by the OPM to pave the way for international forces to enter Papua, using the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as the point of entry. R2P is closely linked to the United Nations (UN), with its origins traced back to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's declaration that emphasizes the enforcement of UN principles for the international community to fulfill its duty to protect. Any attempt to establish R2P as the basis for a new global consensus must be carried out within the UN forum with the utmost consideration.

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The author have declared no potential conflicts of interest concerning this article's research, authorship, and/or publication.

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